📃
Freedom for who
  • Introduction
  • Warning signs for Singapore
  • Summary of analysis
  • Sources
  • References
  • Strengths
    • Contracts
    • Institutional integrity
    • Decentralized authority
    • Fiscal discipline
  • Externalities
    • An incomplete agenda
    • Inequality
    • Singapore's hidden costs
    • Environment
  • Role of the state
    • Post-materialism
    • Shifting role of the state
    • Labor
    • Taxes
    • Scandinavian model
  • Human condition
  • Homo sapien
  • Competitive and cooperative capacity
  • Institutions for complex networks
  • Imperfect information
  • Bounded rationality
  • Measuring prosperity
  • Limits to growth
    • Advance no further
    • Intrinsic limits to labor productivity
    • Automation
    • Global trade slowdown
    • Singapore growth prospects
  • Economics primer
    • Managing the household
    • Capitalism
    • Economic measures
    • Models of production
    • Gross domestic product (GDP)
    • Macroeconomics
    • Keynesian economics
  • Free Market Ideology
    • Economic freedom
    • Ideological foundations
    • Moral philosophy
    • Tragedy of the commons
    • Public choice
    • Rational expectations
    • Washington Consensus
    • Asian Tiger
  • Appendix B : Legatum Prosperity Index
    • Statistical analysis : Legatum Prosperity Index
    • Generic success and labor productivity
    • Competing objectives : trade-offs
    • Dynamic role of the state
    • Uneven evidence for subsets of policies
    • Institution that balance trade-offs
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  • Property rights, contract enforcement
  • Financial credit markets

Was this helpful?

  1. Strengths

Contracts

PreviousReferencesNextInstitutional integrity

Last updated 4 years ago

Was this helpful?

One of the strengths of free market based systems are the mechanisms for voluntary contracts between citizens - property rights, contract enforcement, and credit markets. These institutions enable cooperation on a larger scale than would otherwise occur spontaneously by informal association networks. Specific measures of these institutions is detailed in Table B.8 from the . The Elements were shortlisted because they scored a high value (0 no relationship, 1 very related) in their relationship to the “general success measure” (living conditions) used in the statistical analysis in .

Table B.8 : Legatum Prosperity Index - Elements shortlisted as statistically correlated with general success measure and the score of correlation.

Contract enforcement

Financing ecosystems

Property rights

0.47

1.0

0.88

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms

Legal costs

Quality of judicial administration

Time to resolve commercial cases

Access to finance

Commercial bank branches

Depth of credit information

Financing of SMEs

Quality of banking system and capital markets

Soundness of banks

Venture capital availability

Intellectual property protection

Lawful process for expropriation

Procedures to register property

Protection of property rights

Regulation of property possession and exchange

Reliability of land infrastructure administration

Property rights, contract enforcement

The World Bank economists cited property rights at several points in the report as essential for development. They mentioned that these rights should extend to the informal sector and remarked that in the actual reforms in Latin America these were more of an “afterthought” (Birdsall, 2010). Contract enforcement and property rights were identified in Ostrom’s analysis as essential for sustainable common pool resource governance (Ostrom, 1990).

As Ostrom describes, the failure of the commons is a situation where no participant has the incentive to cooperate with collective rules. She cites binding agreements, arbitrators of conflict resolution and clear boundaries of who has the rights of access for appropriate rents as essential for participants to gain the threshold level of trust that they would be rewarded for the risk of restraint and commitment (Ostrom, 1990).

Financial credit markets

Credit markets together with property rights enable investment and the accumulation of capital. In situations where investments and accumulation of capital are supportive of development goals, financial credit markets are likely to be instrumental to those improvements. While Ostrom did not emphasize the institutions of credit markets, she did mention the importance of continued supply and maintenance of investment capital. Her game theory analysis concluded that participants must be incentivised to make the investments - to have a stake in the long term outcomes by applying low discount rates to the expected future stream of rents (Ostrom, 1990).

Credit markets also like property rights facilitate cooperation on a large scale. They further lower barriers to investment institutions by enabling those with opportunities to deploy capital and make investments to be financed by pooling resources from those who have surplus savings.

Credit markets apply leverage to the economy and this institutional factor was identified as one of the strongest correlated factors to social success measures tested in the analysis in Appendix B. The World Bank review of Latin America reforms provided more qualified critique for financial market reforms. The report cautioned that imperfect credit markets could impede growth and entrench existing inequalities by reinforcing existing corrupt institutions (Birdsall, 2010). The report cautions that rapid deregulation of the financial markets without the corresponding regulatory institutions to monitor, regulate risks and set disclosure standards risked build-up of credit bubbles and instability (Birsdall, 2010).

Legatum Prosperity Index
Appendix B
advertisement for Malaysia property agent, Source : propertyguru.com.my